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REORGANIZING THE ARMY FOR 21ST CENTURY NEEDS: SIMULTANEOUSLY ADDRESSING STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The U. S. Army must be capable of acting rapidly in support of U.S. national interests across the full spectrum of conflict with highly trained forces. However, there is a mismatch between the demands of today's strategic environment and the force structure of the Army. The 'swiftly defeat' Army is not adequately structured for stability and support operations (SASO) or homeland security (HLS) requirements, two mission areas of increasing importance. While reorganizing a portion of the Army for SASO is currently being discussed, no organized effort for tailoring forces for HLS is currently being considered. It is not enough to organize, train, equip and provide forces for high-end conflict. Army transformation must include reorganizing to fully address SASO and HLS requirements. The capabilities and skills required to address these missions are identical enough in nature to recommend one solution to address both needs.
WHY ORGANIZE FOR STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS?
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of U.S.
military interventions worldwide. During the Cold War, the U.S. averaged one major intervention every ten years, but since has averaged one every two years, with two occurring in the last 18 months. 1 With a security strategy focused on rapid decisive operations and preemption, this trend can be expected to continue for some time. Indeed, this is an international trend with nearly 80 percent of the peace operations conducted by the United Nations since 1945
beginning after the end of the Cold War. 2 This increase demonstrates the need for a U.S. Army not only capable of conducting decisive combat operations, but increasingly to conduct SASO to set the conditions for strategic success. Whether before, during, or after decisive combat operations or as a stand alone effort, the Army Transformation Roadmap 2003 states that stability operations are critical to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability, provide humanitarian assistance, establish new governance, restore essential services, and assist in economic reconstruction. 3 It is during the transition from decisive combat operations, a Department of Defense (DOD) led effort, to postconflict operations or nation-building, an interagency or internationally led effort, that strategic success is vulnerable.
Using case studies from Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy studied factors that contribute to success in post-conflict operations and outlined certain lessons learned. A principal conclusion, containing the central recommendation of a working paper titled "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations", is that these case studies "make a strong argument for creating a standing stabilization and reconstruction force as part of the U.S. military". 4 As envisioned, this force would be a dedicated stability and reconstruction joint command (S&R JCOM). The S&R JCOM would be organized, trained and equipped for SASO in order to close "the gap between major combat operations and the beginning of nation and engineer units, totaling 3,000 to 4,000 personnel. These brigades would be trained and equipped specifically for peace operations to relieve the operations tempo pressure on current maneuver units. Although not a formal, staffed response, the concept was shared with the Joint
Staff and the Army Chief of Staff's initiatives group. After initial examination, these offices expressed reservation against creating organizations without full-spectrum combat capability should the environment shift from stability to combat operations. 15 Thought on this along this line began five years ago in a 1998 study titled "Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief." In this study
RAND assessed the post-cold war need to conduct those type operations without "detracting from the nation's ability to prevail in major theater warfare." 16 One of the ten options included in the report recommended the creation of Army Contingency Brigades that would be activated as needed. These brigades would be rapidly deployable and capable of operating independently with integral support. Reviewing operations from 1989 to 1996, RAND points out that force requirements for Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia shared common characteristics. From this, RAND argues that requirements during the initial phase of small scale contingencies are predictable enough to create contingency brigades. RAND recommended that these brigades include organic light infantry, armor, field artillery, special forces, aviation, signal, military police, engineer, intelligence, civil affairs, medical, ordnance, and logistics units, totaling 8,301
personnel. Although not a standing capability, this organizational model would better prepare the Army to respond quickly with a defined structure and established planning factors and doctrine for deployment. These robust brigades would be well suited to conduct interventions and peace operations, as well as be adjusted for specific post-conflict responsibilities.
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The NDU study cited earlier in this paper takes a comprehensive look at the need for The operational concept for the S&R JCOM would be to execute stability and reconstruction operations in tandem with combat operations forces or as a stand alone force.
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As Dr. Binnendijk noted at the IFPA-Fletcher Conference, the goal is to "create this force as a force multiplier which serves as a bridge to nation building." He continued, "this is more about focusing, reorganizing and rebalancing, than it is about creating new capabilities" 21 as well as non-military missions using DOD assets and capabilities in support of lead federal agencies. However, the report criticizes the DOD for failing to evaluate or adjust its force structure to perform the second portion of its mission statement. The GAO strongly urged the Secretary of Defense to move rapidly to determine what steps should be taken to better structure U.S. forces to perform domestic military missions. 30 Much of the discussion on addressing HLS requirements urges DOD to reorganize the Army's reserve components for this mission, particularly the National Guard. The Hart-Rudman Commission urged that the within DOD, National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission and that they should be reorganized, trained, and equipped to undertake that mission. 31 Because of the unique nature, as a dual-missioned state and federal force located in virtually every county in the nation, the National Guard is well positioned as the DOD primary bridge in providing increased military capability to the nation. The National Guard is organized and equipped as a strategic and operational reserve to augment active military forces for sustained overseas combat. Although able to bring large numbers of forces to bear, the current structure of the National Guard does not adequately address homeland security needs.
ROLE OF DOD IN HOMELAND SECURITY -NEED FOR STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT

Completion of NORTHCOM OPLAN 2002 and PACOM OPLAN 2005 should further specify
capabilities required across services and components and guide further force structure analysis.
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SOLUTIONS FOR ORGANIZING FOR HLS EXPLORED
In the nearly two and a half years since 9/11, the only force structure change to address Detachment. These units, identified from existing warfighting structure, bring needed capabilities to respond as required to a broad range of requests for military support to civil authorities and consequence management. To fully operationalize these units the National Guard will seek resourcing to provide additional CBRNE equipment to allow these units to respond in all environments and communications equipment to facilitate interoperability with state and local first responders. 39 The National Guard Bureau effort described above is consistent with the view of the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS). In a point paper on Homeland Security, the associations outlined fifteen key tenants of a successful homeland security strategy related to the National Guard, covering everything from changes in the National Guard Bureau charter to establishment of a joint state task force in each state. While broad in scope, the paper did not identify any changes to the force structure of the National Guard other than the continued establishment of Civil Support Teams in each state. From a force management perspective, recommendations focused on training and equipping existing units for operations in a CBRNE environment. The Adjutants General requested additional specialized CBRNE equipment and modernized communications and transportation equipment to better enable warfighting units to respond to homeland security missions in support of local first responders. 40 Efforts by the National Guard to increase HLS capabilities are not fully assured. On its current Integrated Priority List (IPL), NORTHCOM emphasizes that the National Guard be capable of responding to multiple and simultaneous homeland defense and civil assistance missions. However, NORTHCOM identified inadequate resourcing and training for a transforming National Guard as a capability shortfall which represents risk that is not adequately addressed in the FY05-09 program.
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COMPARISON OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR SASO AND HLS
The three detailed views above of organizing for SASO share a similar viewpoint: the optimum use of existing force structure organized for a specific range of operations to focus effort and relieve demand pressure on combat formations. As proposed by NDU, designating a standing headquarters responsible for SASO and task organizing sub-units as required provides considerable planning and controlling capability toward the SASO mission. The S&RJCOM plans, trains, exercises, develops doctrine, deploys, and is capable of operating under a joint command or as a separate JTF. The figure below depicts the notional S&R JCOM (Figure 1 ). 
RECOMMENDATION
The requirements to address SASO and HLS are similar enough in nature and in sufficient demand to recommend that the Army move aggressively in implementing change. The
Washington Post reported on 24 Nov 03 that "language is being drafted for the Strategic Planning Guidance...that would direct military authorities to explore setting up a stability operations force". 46 This is a step in the right direction. However, the Army should not wait. The
Army should:
-immediately re-look current approved operations plans and fully model Phase IV capability requirements, -work closely w ith NORTHCOM to determine HLS needs and develop appropriate models to build force structure requirements.
-and, reorganize sufficient Active and National Guard forces into SASO/HLS capable structure.
Given the impetus for addressing DOD capability to better conduct SASO on one hand and HLS requirements on the other, one possible solution for organizing can posture a portion of the Army to better satisfy both missions. The maneuver brigade task force, with a command element from the divisional headquarters and augmented with corps assets, has been the solution for most of the contingency operations conducted since 1989. 47 The BCT Template as described above, if equipped with additional CBRNE equipment and radios to coordinate with first responders, contains the basic force structure necessary to respond effectively to HLS missions as well as create a standing SASO capability. These units would be capable of responding to WMD events as required by NORTHCOM, as well provide SASO capability is support of overseas conflict. By relying primarily on existing structure, this is a modest, low risk proposal that can easily be undone if the strategic environment shifts.
Actual composition of the BCT could be adjusted. For example, the number of motorized infantry battalions could be reduced and the MP company could be increased in size to a composite MP Combat Support/Internment & Resettlement battalion as proposed by NDU to ensure better skill to mission match. 48 The composite battalion concept could extend to the engineer battalion, where the skills in a construction, as well as combat engineers are needed for SASO and potential consequence management scenarios.
Whatever the structure, sufficient capacity in both Active and National Guard must be created. While urging the DOD to establish analytical standards for determining their size and design, the NDU study recommends two division-equivalents, one active and one reserve component, to ensure a baseline capability to respond to two medium sized contingencies in moderately difficult conditions. 49 With ongoing SASO operations in the Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a need to have a force capable of responding to HLS missions as required by NORTHCOM, this is clearly not enough structure. The Army should establish two division-equivalents on active duty with an additional two division-equivalents in the National Guard, as the DOD lead for military assistance to state and local governments. 50 The dualmission nature of the National Guard as a federal and state force make it ideally suited to meet this requirement. This would create surge capability for a large-scale conflict, allow for a reasonable rotation factor for ongoing operations, and maintain forces forward deployed across the U.S. to respond to HLS needs.
The dual focus of these units should not be a problem. Active and National Guard BCT would be identical in structure and capable of deploying in support of contingencies both at home and abroad. Active BCT Headquarters would focus on rapid deployment as part of a contingency force for SASO missions, and National Guard BCT Headquarters would focus on civil-military coordination and exercises with first responders for HLS mission requirements. The mission essential task lists of sub-units would be nearly identical in both active and National Guard BCT. Whether conducting stability operations abroad or responding to natural or manmade disasters at home, tasks for military police, engineer, aviation, transportation, chemical, signal, medical and explosive ordnance disposal units would be similar, only the conditions would differ. By organizing to increase skills available to match mission requirements, as opposed to relying on forces available, erosion of readiness during long-term military missions will be reduced.
CONCLUSION
The National Military strategy has focused US military forces on deterring and preventing aggression abroad with robust war fighting capabilities, and to fight and win if these measures fail. The post-Cold War frequency of conflict finds the US military conducting an increasing number of missions to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability. Additionally, 9/11 has dramatically changed the view and sense of urgency for HLS, moving it into a primary mission area. As a result, the Army must rethink its strategy of organizing.
The Army must create a force that enables a rapid transition from conflict to post conflict reconstruction, critical to the effort of winning the peace. This force must deploy as part of the combat formations required for a ground campaign and be capable of sustaining a relatively secure environment in concert with standard combat divisions. This force must also be capable of assisting civil authorities with the optimum skill sets needed for the homeland security mission.
Better organizing structure as recommended in this paper will optimize forces available and posture the Army to better transition to SASO when required, as well as respond rapidly with the type forces needed for domestic HLS needs. Wholesale creation of new capabilities is not required. Reorganizing existing structure is a major forward step in optimizing current Army capability and addressing this need.
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